Abstract
Introduction
Since Paul Pierson's Dismantling the Welfare State? the study of retrenchment has become the main focus of comparative welfare state research. It is often argued that even Scandinavian and Continental welfare states are gripped by measures of privatization (Esping-Andersen  :  ; Veen and Trommel  ; Alber  :  ; Lindbom and Rothstein  :  ). The literature claims that markets increasingly determine individual well-being in dismantled 1 Collectively negotiated benefits represent a theoretical problem for the literature on retrenchment policies as, in a system of welfare provided by industrial agreements, it is not markets that decide on individual well-being but actors that are collective in their nature. Through collectively negotiated benefits, trade unions and employers' organizations are able to maintain competencies in the administration of welfare despite retrenchment policies. Additionally, the income and solidarity losses caused by retrenchment of public benefits may be compensated for by gains which result from benefits negotiated collectively through the agreements between unions and employers.
Hence, if we include industrial agreements on welfare benefits in our analysis of retrenchment policies this probably provides less straightforward and more complex answers to the question of how retrenchment policies affect the role of social partners and the generosity of benefits. The conclusion for comparative welfare state research is that, when viewing policies of welfare state retrenchment, the research should systematically include industrial relations in its frame of reference. Under certain conditions which are worth specifying, collective bargaining may lead to a more complex public-private mix, which changes welfare states in other directions than outright market liberalization. Against this background the article addresses the question: under which conditions do industrial relations become a source of social benefits?
Drawing on Thomas H. Marshall's distinction between political and industrial citizenship, I suggest a typology of institutional contexts within which collectively negotiated benefits evolve and develop. The typology which is set out maintains that the creation of a collectively negotiated welfare system strongly depends, on the one hand, on the degree of state activity in labour relations -hence, the state's role in collective bargaining and government tax, labour and social security legislation supporting industrial agreements on social benefits -and, on the other hand, on the timing of the institutionalization of industrial and political citizenship rights -hence, of the channels of functional and territorial interest representation. This typology is applied to Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Germanythus, to countries where collective agreements on social benefits have recently been concluded. The comparative approach demonstrates the fruitfulness of the suggested typology by applying it to 'a series of relevant historical trajectories' (Skocpol and Somers : ) . In accordance with Skocpol and Somers (: ), the logic of the comparative method the article uses can be called 'the parallel demonstration of theory'. 2 The article is divided into three parts. In the first section, I give a short theoretical account of Marshall's conception of political and industrial citizenship and develop a two-dimensional typology of institutional contexts within which collectively negotiated benefits evolve and develop. The second section applies the the typology to Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands. The third section summarizes my findings and discusses them in the context of the political dynamics which are currently at work both regarding retrenchment policies and industrial relations.
A Typology of Institutional Contexts of Collectively Negotiated Benefits
In what follows, I put forward an analytical framework which allows collectively negotiated benefits to be included in the research on welfare state retrenchment. I proceed in two stages. In the first, I argue that collective welfare schemes -either legally institutionalized by the state through public transfers and insurance schemes or organized on the basis of industrial agreements -are the outcome of political and industrial citizenship rights. In the second stage, based on this distinction between industrial and political citizenship, I develop a typology of institutionalized contexts within which collectively negotiated welfare benefits develop.
Drawing on Marshall's concept of citizenship, I suggest regarding collectively provided welfare schemes as an outcome of political and industrial citizenship rights, hence, of forms of territorial and functional interest representation.
3 With Marshall, we can say that trade unions and employers can use political citizenship, that is, political activities -in Stein Rokkan's () words, the 'electoral channel', in Claus Offe's () words, the system of 'territorial interest representation' -in order to represent their social policy demands. On the other hand, they can also revert to industrial citizenship, that is, to economic activities and collective bargaining -in Rokkan's words, to the 'corporate channel', in Offe's words, to the system of 'functional representation' -as an appropriate means of interest representation in social policy. With Marshall (: ), we can reason that through collective agreements social rights may not only be established by political rights but also by the 'secondary system of industrial citizenship', which in modern democracies has evolved 'parallel and supplementary to the system of political citizenship '. 4 With regard to collectively negotiated welfare benefits -which are at the focus of this article -we may presume that trade unions or employers sometimes use the political arena to lobby party-political actors in order to enact legal measures which support collectively negotiated welfare schemes.
5
Governments may be receptive to such demands because they may develop an independent interest in collective agreements on welfare if they view these agreements as a way of avoiding blame for cuts in public benefits (Trampusch ) -hence, governments may support collectively negotiated welfare schemes by legal measures. This perspective leads us to say that political actors may provide both a supportive and a redistributive role for collectively negotiated benefits through state activity in labour relations, namely state intervention in collective bargaining 6 and/or tax, labour and social security legislation.
More generally -in line with Bernhard Ebbinghaus (: ) -we may further presume that political citizenship and industrial citizenship perform different functions and mobilize in a different arena (Ebbinghaus : ) . How trade unions (as well as employers' organizations) make use of these two arenas reflects historical processes, specifically, pathways of integration of unions and employers into polity and economy in the course of industrialization, nation-building and state formation (Ebbinghaus ; Streeck and Hassel ) . Drawing on Ebbinghaus (: ), we can maintain that the degree of differentiation of the two arenas and the sequencing in the opening of the two arenas are decisive for the arena in which collective actors mobilize and are engaged in order to represent their social policy demands. Ebbinghaus (: -) points out: 'if the political channel [the political arena] remains closed longer, one can expect a "politicization" of the organization in the corporate channel [the economic arena], mobilizing collective action for political change, while in the reverse case, unions will seek political alliance and support to make up for the lack of power in the labor market'. In other words: the timing of the institutionalization of political and industrial citizenship is crucial for the role that public intervention and industrial agreements have in the provision of welfare benefits. In this sense, we may also assume that, in countries where political citizenship has developed before industrial citizenship, public social insurance schemes clearly precede the development of industrial agreements of welfare, and vice versa.
To sum up: we can argue that the necessary analytical frame allowing us to study the evolution and development of a system of collectively negotiated welfare schemes is defined, on the one hand, by the state's behaviour in labour relations, hence by its role in collective bargaining and in enacting tax, labour and social security legislation intended to support collectively negotiated benefits -in short, in terms of whether the state is active or passive in labour relations -and, on the other hand, by the timing of the institutionalization of political and industrial citizenship rights (see figure ) .
Countries in which the state is active and in which industrial citizenship predates political citizenship show a more developed system of collectively negotiated benefits than countries in which the state is passive and in which political citizenship predates industrial citizenship. I hypothesize that if the institutionalization of political citizenship precedes the institutionalization of industrial citizenship, trade unions and employers will favour political activities in order to represent their social policy demands. This hinders the development of industrial agreements on welfare benefits and promotes the institutionalization of public insurance schemes. However, if the state is active and supports collectively negotiated benefits by measures affecting tax, social security and labour law or by interventions in collective bargaining, industrial agreements on welfare benefits may also develop in countries in which political citizenship predates industrial citizenship. On the other hand, if the institutionalization of industrial citizenship precedes the institutionalization of political citizenship, trade unions and employers will be much more supportive of concluding collective agreements in order to represent their social policy demands. Again, an active state supports the development of collective agreements on welfare benefits.
In sum, social rights can be advanced differentially and the sphere of industrial relations may not be ignored when analysing the degree of social benefits that society enjoys. In what follows, I apply the theoretical accounts described above to the Danish, French, Dutch and German cases by combining them with a description of the development of the collectively negotiated welfare schemes in these countries. 
Collectively Negotiated Benefits in Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Germany
Recent studies of the European Industrial Relations Observatory reveal that in various Continental and Scandinavian welfare states collective agreements are increasingly being used to regulate and finance welfare issues (EIRO , , a, b). Empirical evidence which the author has collected on the basis of these studies show a strengthening of the self-regulative role of the collective bargaining partners in the domains of occupational pensions, early retirement and further training in Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Germany. 7 The evidence shows that in all four countries collective agreements on welfare schemes have been concluded. Nearly always these schemes have been additionally supported by state measures affecting tax, social security and labour law.
Tables  and  describe the state's role in collective bargaining, the timing of the institutionalization of industrial and political citizenship and the formation of public insurance schemes in these four countries.
In the following section, I argue that we can apply the suggested typology to the four cases (figure ). Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands represent four pathways to a system of collectively negotiated benefits.
In Denmark, the state's role in collective bargaining is passive, and legal intervention in collective bargaining is traditionally very limited.
8 Industrial citizenship rights were institutionalized before political citizenship rights. The first major national agreement was concluded in , whereas parliamentarism, or rather, a cabinet responsible toward parliament, was only introduced in  (table ) . In addition, in the year in which freedom of associationspecifically, the right to form a trade union -was legally granted, namely in , only . per cent of the population participated in elections (table ) .
In France, government intervenes in collective bargaining. Political integration predated industrial integration. The first major national agreement was only concluded in ,  years after parliamentarism had been introduced (table ). In addition, in the year in which freedom of association was legally granted, in , . per cent of the population already participated in elections (table ) .
As in France, political citizenship in Germany was achieved before industrial citizenship rights were used by trade unions and employers. However, in contrast to France, the state's role in collective bargaining is passive. In Germany, the first major national agreement was concluded in , but already in  there was the first election at which at least  per cent of the male adult population were enfranchised (table ). In addition, in the year in which freedom of association was legally granted, in , . per cent of the population already participated in elections (table ).
In the Netherlands, industrial integration predated political integration, as in Denmark. However, in contrast to Denmark, government intervenes in collective bargaining. The first major national agreement was concluded in , whereas proportional representation was only introduced in  (table ). In addition, in the year in which freedom of association was legally granted, in , only . per cent of the population participated in elections (table ).
The typology suggests that countries in which the state plays an active role in labour relations (France) and/or where functional interest representation developed before territorial interest representation was institutionalized (Netherlands/Denmark) have a much more developed system of collectively negotiated benefits than countries where none of these conditions applies (Germany). Empirical evidence on the development of collectively negotiated benefits confirms this argument (about which, see note ): the Netherlands has the most developed system of benefits based on industrial agreements. Germany has the worst developed system, with only marginal state funding, low coverage rates of collective agreements, and agreements only concluded in a few sectors and then only recently. Whereas in Denmark, France and the Netherlands the use of the collective bargaining system to provide and finance welfare has a long tradition, in Germany collectively negotiated benefits are much more short-term phenomena. In Denmark, France and the Netherlands, in all three reported domains, benefits are widespread and have a long tradition (an exception is the Danish collective agreements on pensions which were concluded in the early s). It is striking that tax exemptions are independent of institutionalized traditions of state intervention in labour relations and patterns of interest representation. They are used as supportive and redistributive instruments in all four countries.
In the four countries the timing of the institutionalization of political and industrial citizenship has obviously influenced the mix of public schemes and industrial agreements on welfare provision (table ). In countries where political citizenship developed before industrial citizenship was institutionalized -as in France and Germany -public social insurance schemes clearly advanced the development of collective agreements on social benefits: in France and Germany an obligatory public pension insurance scheme was introduced in  and  respectively, hence, before the first national collective agreement was concluded (in  and  respectively). Countries where industrial citizenship developed before political citizenship was institutionalized -as in Denmark and the Netherlandsbelong to the group in which public insurance schemes lagged behind the formation of the collective bargaining system. In the Netherlands, an obligatory public pension insurance scheme was only introduced in , six years after the first national collective agreement was reached. In Denmark, an obligatory public pension insurance scheme was only introduced in ,  years after the first national collective agreement was reached.
The importance of the state's role in labour relations becomes clear if we compare the Netherlands and France with Denmark and Germany. In the Netherlands and France, there are legal requirements to reach collective agreements on welfare issues (with respect to occupational pensions in both countries, with respect to training in France).
9 In Denmark and Germany, the principle of free collective bargaining permits state intervention in labour relations, and so collectively negotiated benefits have mainly developed on the basis of initiatives taken by trade unions and employers. The legal obligations in France and the Netherlands fit with the fact that both cases belong to the group of countries where the state plays an active role in collective bargaining (table ). Active role means that the state may intervene in collective bargaining in procedural as well as substantive terms by declaring collective agreements binding (with extension based on the 'erga omnes' principle), 10 by imposing statutory minimum wages or by intervening in wage bargaining (only in the Netherlands, not in France). Unlike France and the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark are cases where the state only has a passive role due to the principle of self-regulation in wage bargaining, which interdicts statutory minimum wages and operates in tandem with a minimum use of extension procedures.
The decisive effect of the timing of the institutionalization of political and industrial citizenship is obvious in Denmark and the Netherlands. Here, welfare issues are increasingly the result of linking the collectively negotiated welfare schemes to wage bargaining. Linkages between wages and welfare exist in all three domains, that is, in occupational pensions, early retirement and further training. In both countries, this coordination between wage and welfare has just recently been strengthened by tripartite agreements in which the government, trade unions and employers consent to coordinate legislative actions of the state with the bargaining activities of unions and employers. According to the Danish so-called tripartite 'Mousetrap Agreement' of , unions and employers may reopen collective negotiations if parliament adopts legislation which changes the basis of the sectoral agreements, for example, through initiatives which increase employers' costs in the industrial sector. The mousetrap clause is intended to keep the political actors from intervening in matters which traditionally fall under the competence of the social partners ( Jørgensen ) . In the Dutch 'Museum square agreement ' (Museumpleinakkoord ) of , trade unions, employers' organizations and the government reached an agreement on early retirement and 'life-span leave' arrangements (levensloopregeling), occupational disability insurance and moderate wage increases in  (Zaal ).
The occupational pension system serves as an instructive example of the welldeveloped system of industrial agreements on welfare operating in the Netherlands. In their analysis of the public-private interactions over pensions, Rein and Turner (: ) call the Dutch system 'interaction as harmonization'. From the inception of public pensions, the Dutch government has made legal provisions for private pensions in order to link the development of pensions in the public-private sphere to that found in the private sphere, and vice versa. Thereby, according to Rein and Turner () , four collective social mechanisms have evolved: conventions, covenants, collective (contractual) agreements and coercion (mandating). These 'four C's' tie the public and the private system together in such a way 'that a decline in the level of public provision is offset by an increase in the mandatory funded private system' (: ). However, this 'harmony' between the public and private pensions systems does not belie the conflicts between employees and employers and between employees and pensioners which have arisen in the context of rising contribution rates to the occupational pension systems (about which, see Kaar ) .
11 A large share of the pension funds' resources has been invested in the stock market and is now suffering from a shortfall because of dramatically reduced share prices.
Conclusion and Prospects
Based on Marshall's conception of political and industrial citizenship, the article suggests an analytical framework which allows us to include collectively negotiated benefits in the debate on and study of retrenchment. I have sketched a two-dimensional typology of institutional contexts within which systems of collectively negotiated welfare evolve and develop: the first dimension comprises the state's activity or passivity in labour relations, namely its role in collective bargaining and its role in enacting measures on tax, social security and labour law which support collectively negotiated benefits; the second dimension is the timing of the institutionalization of political and industrial citizenship rights. Following the comparative method 'parallel demonstration of theory', this typology has been applied to four countries: Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands.
The development of collectively negotiated benefits contains important lessons for our understanding of how industrial relations affect the development of welfare states. The divergent development of industrial agreements on welfare benefits in Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Germany indicate that differences in pathways of the formation of political and industrial citizenship and different traditions in the state's role in labour relations strongly affect actors' preferences in the proper private-public mix to the provision and financing of welfare. Gilbert's (: ; italics by Gilbert) statement that 'the meaning of privatization is . . . defined as a change in the initial organization of state and market responsibilities for social welfare toward more market and less state' needs to be supplemented by a historical reconstruction of trade unions' and employers' preference formation regarding the mix of public and industrial welfare benefits. Under certain conditions, which are worth specifying, collective bargaining may lead to a more complex public-private mix that shifts welfare states in other directions than outright market liberalization.
These conditions are not only shaped by the historical trajectories of the government's behaviour in industrial relations and the timing of the institutionalization of industrial and political rights -as I have argued in this article -but also by the current politics of welfare state retrenchment and of collective bargaining. With reference to these politics, complex, sometimes also contradictory dynamics may evolve which further studies should take into account.
Prima facie, collectively negotiated benefits may be of interest to state actors, trade unions and employers (Ståhlberg : ; Ebbinghaus ; Trampusch ). Governments may use collective agreements as an instrument of blame avoidance vis-à-vis the electorate in times of public cutbacks while collectively negotiated benefits may relieve the state of some responsibility for supporting social cohesion through public welfare. On the trade unions' side, collectively negotiated benefits may represent a way to stabilize collective bargaining systems through the introduction of new issues in collective bargaining; on the employers' side, collectively negotiated benefits may be attractive due to deferred wages, that is, wage restraint in exchange for welfare. However, the use of collective agreements as a way to finance and regulate social benefits may be a less consensual phenomenon than these rational interest calculations of the actors involved suggest.
Although the blame-avoidance hypothesis is supported by the Dutch case, where the government has recently strengthened its funding of collectively negotiated benefits (on which, see Cox : -; Trampusch : ) and although industrial agreements on social benefits have gained increasing attention in the political process in France (Dufour ) and Germany (Trampusch ) , it remains unclear whether collectively negotiated social benefits lift the burden of the costs of public welfare from governments. According to an OECD analysis (OECD ), tax breaks for private welfare (e.g. occupational pensions) leads to increasing cost for public finances in the long term. This suggests a need to analyse the fiscal limits of an expansive role for collectively negotiated welfare in order to understand the reform strategies of governments.
For trade unions benefits by collective agreements are a mixed blessing. On the one hand, they may represent a way to recruit members, revitalize organizational resources and compensate for losses in public welfare, as is pointed out by Oorschot (: ) for the Netherlands or by Øverbye (: ) and Madsen () for Denmark. On the other hand, within a system of collectively negotiated benefits the extent of social security is limited and more selective in contrast to social security provided by nationwide, state-controlled, compulsory institutions. Workers who are employed in prosperous and high-technology sectors are rewarded with better packages of wage and welfare compensation. Unskilled workers with a weaker bargaining position will be thrown back to needs-based social assistance programmes (Cox : ) . Collectively negotiated benefits may also reflect and reinforce inequalities in the workplace; they may disadvantage women and workers in atypical employment; they may give rise to distributional conflicts between labour market insiders and outsiders.
Other contradictory dynamics may evolve from the fact that recent cases of concession bargaining destroy encompassing industrial agreements rather than supplementing social rights. In this context, the sustainability of collectively negotiated welfare schemes may be constrained (and probably lowered) by the general trend of the dismantling of centralized collective bargaining systems, with collective bargaining even accelerating the move to outright market liberalization by transferring wage bargaining to the firm level and the workplace. Additionally, small and medium-sized firms may not be able and willing to pay the costs of welfare benefits and, hence, demand to opt out of industrial agreements; a dynamic which in  has evolved in the German case when the protest and resistance by small and medium-sized firms has prevented legislation that would have established sectoral funds to finance and regulate training.
In sum, the question whether industrial agreements may become a source of social policy can only be answered when taking into account the empirical evidence on the politics which are currently at work regarding both public policies and collective bargaining. However, the typology suggested may give us a plausible theoretical reason why we should systematically include industrial relations in our frame of reference in order to understand current retrenchment policies and their effects on individual well-being and the social cohesion of society. In addition, the comparative analysis of the Danish, French, German and Dutch cases gives us pieces of evidence that the analysis of welfare-state reform might be enriched by examining the self-regulatory role that unions and employers may at times adopt through providing welfare on the basis of collective agreements. and secondary literature, the author has compiled empirical data on the development of collective agreements on occupational pensions, early retirement and further training in Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands. The data also sketch the development of state measures affecting tax, social security and labour law which support these agreements. The data are published in Trampusch  (table ) . Due to the word restrictions of this journal the tables have not been attached to this article. . According to a recent study of the Danish Ministry of Labour (), 'collective agreements are estimated to regulate more than % of the Danish labor market'; the study has stated that the Danish parliament 'has not so far allowed the scope of collective agreements to be widened by executive orders, or otherwise' (quoted in Gill et al. : ) . . An instructive example of the importance of legal obligations is occupational pensions. In the Netherlands and France, the coverage rates of occupational pensions are much higher than in Denmark and Germany due to legal measures which make the systems obligatory for employers and employees. . At present, the Dutch government has declared  of the CAO-fondsen generally binding for all employees working in the sector. In , the revenue of these funds amounted to  million euros and the expenditure to  million euros (MinSZW ). . Robbert van het Kaar (: ) concludes: 'Although the collective occupational pension system in the Netherlands is often presented as an example in the European context, cracks are beginning to appear.'
